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Parens Patriae and the Union
Carbide Case: The Disaster
at Bhopal Continues
On the night of December 2, 1984, methyl isocyanate gas escaped from
a pesticide plant owned by Union Carbide India, Ltd.' The deadly gas
spread over the Indian city of Bhopal, killing approximately 1,700 peo-
ple and injuring 200,000 others. 2 American lawyers raced to India.3 On
December 7, 1984, only five days after the disaster, they filed the first of
145 lawsuits in the United States on behalf of Indian citizens against
Union Carbide Corp., the U.S. parent corporation of Union Carbide
India, Ltd.4
The Union of India ("India") entered the litigation on April 8,
1985, claiming the exclusive right to represent the plaintiffs pursuant to
a specially enacted Ordinance (hereinafter "Bhopal Ordinance"). 5 The
Southern District of New York denied India exclusive representation of
the plaintiffs' claims, and ordered instead the formation of an executive
committee to represent the plaintiffs.6 When Union Carbide offered
$358 million as a settlement, the plaintiffs' executive committee wished
1. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842, 844
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd as modified, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 199
(1987). Methyl isocyanate is a highly toxic gas used in the production of Sevin and
Temik, which are pesticides produced by Union Carbide, India, Ltd. Exposure to the
gas can result in an agonizing death, or severe injuries. Long term exposure to the
gas can have genetic and carcinogenic consequences. See Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) § 65870 (Feb. 1984) (quoting plaintiffs' complaint for Union of India v. Union
Carbide Corp.).
2. Riley, Bhopal: The Legal Escalation Begins in Earnest, 7 Nat'l LJ., Apr. 22, 1985,
at 8, col. 1. In addition to filing personal injury suits in the United States, a group of
plaintiffs' lawyers also filed suit against the Indian government in India, alleging that
the government could not exclusively represent the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs claimed
that India had a conflict of interest, and that the Bhopal Ordinance, granting exclu-
sive representation to India, violated Indian constitutional guarantees. Id.
3. See Riley, U.S. Lawyers Court Disaster in Bhopal, 7 Nat'l LJ., Dec. 31, 1984, at 3,
col. 2.
4. In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 844. All references to Union Car-
bide Corp. designate the U.S. parent corporation. References to Union Carbide,
India, Ltd., refer to the Indian subsidiary, 51% of which is owned by Union Carbide
Corp.
5. The Bhopal Tragedy: Social and Legal Issues, 20 TEx. INT'L LJ. 267, 285 (1985);
Riley, New Bhopal Law May Affect Future Role of U.S. Lawyers, 7 Nat'l LJ., Mar. 11, 1985,
at 4, col. 3 (summarizing the key provisions of the Bhopal Ordinance).
6. Judge Selects Panel to Direct Bhopal Litigation, 193 N.Y.LJ., Apr. 26, 1985, at 1,
col. 1.
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to accept the offer, but India refused. 7
India based its suit on the common law doctrine of parens patriae,8
which allows a state to sue to protect the well-being of its citizens when
no citizen has standing to sue.9 The district court, however, dismissed
the case without reaching the parens patriae issue. Relying on forum non
conveniens, the court dismissed the case because it found India a more
appropriate and convenient forum to hear the suit. 1° The plaintiffs are
currently pursuing litigation in India. I"
Many scholars agree that litigation in India is not an adequate solu-
tion. 12 Moreover, by granting itself the exclusive right to handle the
case through the Bhopal Ordinance, the Indian government has left the
plaintiffs without any authority in settlement decisions. India's use of
the parens patriae doctrine may allow the Indian government to keep any
compensation, rather than disbursing it among the victims.13 This Note
argues that settlement is usually in the best interests of the victims in
industrial disaster cases, since injured persons need rapid compensa-
tion. By dismissing the case to India, the victims no longer have the
choice to settle rather than litigate.
The district court could have avoided this result by reaching India's
parens patriae claim. Although the district court denied India the right to
exclusively represent the plaintiffs, 14 it never decided whether India had
7. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
8. Riley, supra note 2.
9. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
10. In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 876.
11. Carbide Agrees to Try Bhopal Case in India, 195 N.Y.L.J.,June 13, 1986, at 1, col.
1.
12. The plaintiffs' attorneys also argued that India's legal system is not equipped
to handle the complexities of such a large tort action. Ironically, India made the same
argument in trying to keep the action in the U.S. courts. In re Union Carbide Corp.,
634 F. Supp. at 867. The district court rejected this argument, finding that although
"[p]laintiffs allege that the Indian justice system has not yet cast off the burden of
colonialism to meet the emerging needs of a democratic people ... to retain the
litigation in this forum ... would be yet another example of imperialism .... Id.
For the argument that India's legal system is inadequate to handle the Bhopal litiga-
tion, see Galanter, Legal Torpor: Why So Little Has Happened in India After the Bhopal
Tragedy, 20 TEx. INT'L L.J. 273 (1985). Mr. Galanter discusses several shortcomings
of the Indian legal system. First, tort law is uncodified, and there are few Indian tort
cases. Courts charge enormous fees to discourage suits from being brought. Fur-
thermore, there are no civil juries to decide cases and assess damages. Second,
courts are viewed as places to pursue disputes with neighbors, rather than places to
secure redress from remote, impersonal entities. Finally, the Indian lawyer is only a
courtroom advocate, not an investigator, intermediary, negotiator, trustee, planner,
or advisor. These roles are left to businessmen, clerks, politicians, and administra-
tors. Id. at 274-79. These shortcomings will make discovery and proof of fault diffi-
cult in the Bhopal cases because the cause of the accident is unclear. Indeed, the
ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court of India stated: "It is my opinion that these cases
must be pursued in the United States .... It is the only hope these unfortunate
people have .. " Stewart, Why Suits for Damages Such as Bhopal Claims are Very Rare in
India, Wall St.J., Jan. 23, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
13. See infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
14. In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 844. The district court's forum
non conveniens decision did not encompass the parens patriae issue. See infra notes 21-
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proper standing to sue under parens patriae. As this Note subsequently
argues, India had no right to claim parens patriae standing. If the court
had denied India standing, the plaintiffs could have accepted Union Car-
bide's settlement offer. By not deciding theparenspatriae issue, the court
allowed India to remain a party to the litigation. Thus, India could and
did effectively block any settlement by refusing to accept Union Car-
bide's offer.
This Note analyzes parens patriae, the doctrine under which the
Indian government asserted the right to sue Union Carbide on behalf of
the individual plaintiffs. Given the current limits of the doctrine, the
Note argues that India is not entitled to parens patriae standing. The
Note further argues that settlement is currently the best solution to such
disaster cases, and that determination of the parens patriae issue is neces-
sary to facilitate settlement. Finally, the Note discusses the pros and
cons of a class action suit, which some courts have suggested as an alter-
native to a parens patriae suit.
I. Background
A. History of the Bhopal Litigation
The Bhopal litigation began with the filing of the first lawsuit against
Union Carbide Corp. in the United States on December 7, 1984.15 One
hundred and forty-four lawsuits followed in seven forums.1 6 The Judi-
cial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation joined the plaintiffs and assigned
them to the Southern District of New York for consolidated pretrial
proceedings.' 7
On February 20, 1985, the Union of India enacted an ordinance,
granting itself "the exclusive right to represent, and act in place of every
person who has made claim or is entitled to make" a claim against
Union Carbide Corp. for the Bhopal disaster.' 8 The Indian Govern-
23 and accompanying text. A suit asparenspatriae is not necessarily an exclusive rem-
edy. Although the State has been the only one with standing to sue in all of the
existing cases, no court has specifically adopted exclusivity as a requirement for
parens patriae standing. Because a quasi-sovereign interest is an "interest behind the
titles of its citizens," the possibility exists that both the state and a private citizen
could have standing to sue. Because the exclusivity of parens patriae is unclear, one
cannot infer that the court allowed such standing by referring to the decisions on
other motions.
15. In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 844.
16. Id
17. In re Union Carbide Corp., 601 F. Supp. 1035 (J.P.M.D.L. 1985).
18. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. For an argument that the Bhopal
Ordinance violates India's Constitution, see Chittor, A Second Bhopal Disaster, 7 Nat'l
LJ., May 13, 1985, at 13, col. 1. Mr. Chittor makes four arguments: the Bhopal
Ordinance denies the claimants a chance to express their views on every significant
issue of the case; deprives them of a property right; prevents them from carrying on
their business when a necessary concomitant of that business is pursuing the actiona-
ble claims that arise from it; and violates the rights of equality and equal protection
under the law.
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ment filed suit in the Southern District of New York on April 8, 1985,19
relying on the doctrine of parens patriae to sue on behalf of all of the
victims of the Union Carbide disaster.20
Judge Keenan of the Southern District of New York refused to hear
any motions until the plaintiffs formed an executive committee to repre-
sent the plaintiffs, consisting of three lawyers who had not solicited cli-
ents in India. 2' At this point, India requested the right to exclusively
represent the plaintiffs. 22 The court denied India's request, but failed to
determine whether India had the right as parens patriae to participate in
the litigation. 2 3
Union Carbide Corp. then moved to dismiss the action on the
ground of forum non conveniens. 24 After hearing arguments for both
sides, Judge Keenan postponed his decision to give the parties time to
settle. Union Carbide then made a settlement offer of $358 million
which the individual plaintiffs wished to accept. 25
India found the amount "totally unacceptable" 2 6 and took action to
block settlement. Michael Ciressi, counsel for the Indian government,
and one of the three-member executive committee representing the
plaintiffs, threatened that India would refuse to acknowledge the offer as
a final settlement and would continue to litigate under parens patriae even
if the court approved the settlement offer.2 7 Union Carbide, probably
fearing that India could successfully sue and obtain ajudgment for addi-
tional compensation, refused to settle. 28
Union Carbide based its refusal to settle on the fear of double liabil-
ity, a problem which the courts have repeatedly recognized in parens
patriae cases. Defendants in disaster cases rely on courts to identify who
19. In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 844.
20. See Riley, supra note 2.
21. Judge Selects Panel to Direct Bhopal Litigation, 193 N.Y.L.J., Apr. 26, 1985, at 1,
col. 1.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842, 845
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). The doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a court to dismiss the
litigation, even though it has jurisdiction, if a foreign court is better suited to hear the
case. In making its decision, a court may consider the practical problems of a trial,
such as the location of the proof and availability of compulsory process for the
attendance of unwilling witnesses. A court may also consider public interests such as
the congestion of the courts, the local interest of having localized controversies
decided at home, and conflict of law problems. See Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S.
235 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
25. [9 Current Report] Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 173 (June 11, 1986). Under Union
Carbide's initial $358 million settlement offer, each victim would have received
approximately $1750. [9 Current Report] Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 107 (April 9, 1986).
26. Indian Government Rejects Carbide's Settlement Offer, 195 N.Y. LJ., Mar. 25, 1986,
at 1, col. 1. India's position has been that it will only settle for an amount that will
fully and adequately compensate all victims. Although the plaintiffs wished to accept
the offer, the Government of India threatened court action if the plaintiffs did so.
Unwilling to settle unless all the parties agreed, Union Carbide withdrew the offer.
27. [9 Current Report] Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 107 (Apr. 9, 1986).
28. See supra note 26.
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has standing to sue. Once a defendant knows with which parties it must
negotiate a settlement, it can settle with the security that no other poten-
tial liability exists.
After Union Carbide withdrew its settlement offer, the court ruled,
in response to an earlier motion by Union Carbide, that India was a
more appropriate forum to hear the case. 29 The court conditioned dis-
missal of the Bhopal litigation on three requirements: 1) that Union
Carbide Corp. submit to Indian jurisdiction; 2) that Union Carbide
Corp. allow discovery in compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure; and 3) that Union Carbide Corp. agree to satisfy any judgment
rendered by the Indian courts.3 0 The court refused to hold a fairness
hearing on the $358 million settlement offer prior to deciding the forum
non conveniens motion.3 1
The two attorneys representing the plaintiffs, rather than the inter-
ests of India, appealed both the forum non conveniens decision and the
court's refusal to hold a fairness hearing on the settlement offer.3 2 The
plaintiffs' brief argued that, by denying the fairness hearing, the court
was allowing India to block settlement.33 Therefore, India's parens
patriae lawsuit usurped the plaintiffs' cause of action, depriving them of a
property right and "violat[ing] the due process standard of the U.S.
Constitution."3 4 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's forum
non conveniens decision and affirmed the condition that Union Carbide
submit to Indian jurisdiction, while reversing the other two condi-
tions.3 5 The Second Circuit never reached the parens patriae issue.3 6
29. In re Union Carbide Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842, 845 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
30. Id. at 867. The district court fashioned the conditions for dismissal of the
case to provide for the concerns the plaintiffs had in trying the case in India, and the
reasons they sought suits in the United States originally. [9 Current Reports] Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) 4 (Jan. 8, 1986).
31. [9 Current Report] Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 313 (Sept. 10, 1986). The second
circuit affirmed the denial of the fairness hearing. In re Union Carbide Gas Plant
Disaster, 809 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 199 (1987). As a result,
Union Carbide Corp. submitted to Indian jurisdiction, triggering India to file suit in
an Indian court. Carbide Agrees to Try Bhopal Case in India, 195 N.Y.LJ.,June 13, 1986,
at 1, col. 2.
32. Id. The plaintiffs' brief argued that the district court "took a far too narrow
and literalistic interpretation of forum non conveniens law." According to the brief,
the core of the case lies not in what happened in Bhopal, but with the responsibility
of Union Carbide Corp. The key evidence for this responsibility is that corporate
headquarters is in Connecticut, not Bhopal. See supra note 28.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 199 (1987). The second circuit held that the court could not
require Union Carbide to consent to the enforcement of an Indian judgment and to
abide by the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. First, the
court reasoned that the New York courts could enforce such a judgment against
Union Carbide if it met the requirements of the New York Statute and did not violate
the corporation's due process. See Art. 53, Recognition of Foreign Money Judg-
ments, 7B N.Y. CIV. PROC. L. & R. §§ 5301-09 (McKinney 1978). If ajudgment failed
to meet the due process requirements, Union Carbide could raise this problem as a
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Through the Bhopal Ordinance, India sought exclusive control of
the litigation. Despite the difficulties foreign plaintiffs may encounter
suing in U.S. courts, they do not receive any more rights than domestic
claimants.3 7 India has the same parenspatriae rights in U.S. courts as indi-
vidual states would have. As will be discussed, India cannot create parens
patriae standing by assuming the individuals' claims. Ironically, although
the individual claimants had overcome the difficulty of suing in the
United States, India prevented them from pursuing the litigation.
B. History of Parens Patriae
Parens patriae literally means "parent of the country." The doctrine
developed in England from the common law concept of the royal pre-
rogative.3 8 The Sovereign was "the general guardian of all infants, idi-
ots, and lunatics" and represented their interest as parens patriae.3 9
English law required the following four elements before granting the
sovereign parens patriae representation: 1) the party is legally incapable
of securing his rights; 2) the sovereign or his representative is the only
alternative; 3) the sovereign has a duty to protect the subject's welfare;
and 4) the sovereign has no personal interest and acts on someone else's
behalf.40
Although the United States adopted these general elements of the
parens patriae doctrine from English law, the U.S. courts modified the
doctrine after independence to accommodate the new federal struc-
ture.4 1 Parens patriae has now become a tool that states use to protect
the well-being of their citizens when no one citizen has standing to sue
defense. Second, the court would not require Union Carbide to submit to the exclu-
sive discovery requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because the
court could not require the Indian government to similarly submit. Despite these
holdings, the court required Union Carbide to submit to Indian jurisdiction.
36. Id.; see supra note 14.
37. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612, 616 (8th Cir. 1975).
38. The royal prerogative consists of those rights and capacities which the King
singularly enjoys. It is a special pre-eminence which the sovereign has over all other
persons. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1195 (5th ed. 1979). For an in-depth discussion
of the history ofparens patriae in England, see Comment, Parens Patriae Antitrust Suits by
Foreign Nations, 6 DENJ. INT'L L. & POL'Y 705, 712 (1977).
39. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *48.
40. Comment, supra note 38, at 719.
41. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600-01 (1981)
(footnotes omitted). Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S 1 (1900), illustrates these changes.
The Court held that Louisiana could not sue as parens patriae when representing par-
ticular plaintiffs; the general public must suffer harm.
It is in [the] aspect [that the harm affects the public at large] that the bill
before us is framed. Its gravamen is not a special and peculiar injury such as
would sustain an action by a private person, but the State of Louisiana
presents herself in the attitude ofparenspatriae, trustee, guardian or represen-
tative of all her citizens .... Inasmuch as the vindication of the freedom of
interstate commerce is not committed to the State of Louisiana, and that
State is not engaged in such commerce, the cause of action must be regarded
not as involving any infringement of the powers of the State of Louisiana, or
any special injury to her property, but as asserting that the State is entitled to
Vol. 21
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and thus cannot remedy the problem.4 2
In the United States, the doctrine of parens patriae was historically
used by one State to sue another.43 In 1975, however, a foreign govern-
ment first claimed parens patriae standing.44 Although the court did not
explicitly decide if a foreign government could claim parens patriae stand-
ing, by using the traditional common law analysis the court implicitly
decided that a foreign government may claim parens patriae standing like
a state, if the government meets the necessary requirements. A history
of the parens patriae issue as it developed within the United States is nec-
essary to understand the relevance of this issue to the Bhopal situation.
II. Requirements For Parens Patriae Standing
A. Necessity of a Quasi-Sovereign Interest
The primary requirement for a State to maintain parens patriae standing is
harm to a State's quasi-sovereign interest.4 5 Quasi-sovereign interests
seek relief in this way because the matters complained of affect her citizens at
large.
Id. at 19. Louisiana sought to enjoin Texas from maintaining a quarantine which
established an embargo on goods shipped from New Orleans. Texas introduced the
quarantine because a single case of yellow fever had developed in New Orleans. The
Court denied parens patriae standing to Louisiana for failure to assert an injury to a
quasi-sovereign interest of the state. The court held that no controversy existed
between the two states because "acts of state officers in abuse or excess of their pow-
ers cannot be laid hold of as in themselves committing one State to a distinct collision
with a sister State." Id. at 22. The court further held that the bill did not present a
controversy between a State and citizens of another State, but the court did not give
any reason for this conclusion. See id. at 22-23. The court focused on the require-
ment of a distinct controversy between two states or between a State and the citizens
of another State because Louisiana sought to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction.
Id. at 23. In contrast, when a party does not seek to invoke the Court's jurisdiction
for determiningparenspatiae standing, the Court merely requires that a state assert a
quasi-sovereign interest, making it more than a nominal party. Alfred L. Snapp &
Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). The Court did not define a
quasi-sovereign interest. However, the Court did establish that such an interest
existed independently from individuals' interests, and involved injury to the entire
populace.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 51-54.
43. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902) (Kansas sued to enjoin Col-
orado from diverting the water of the Arkansas River and thereby drastically reduc-
ing the volume of water flowing through Kansas); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208
(1901) (Missouri sued to enjoin Illinois from discharging the sewage of Chicago into
the Mississippi river); Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S, 1 (1900) (Louisiana sued Texas to
enjoin Texas from maintaining a quarantine on Louisiana goods).
44. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975). This was the first case in
which a foreign government claimed parens patriae standing. India, Iran, the Philip-
pines, and Vietnam unsuccessfully sought parens patriae standing to sue U.S. pharma-
ceutical companies for price fixing. Although the court did not explicitly state that a
foreign government could claimparenspatriae standing, the court used the traditional
common law analysis, implying that a foreign government could sue asparenspatriae if
the government met the traditional requirements. Id.
45. Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601. United States courts developed the concept
of a quasi-sovereign interest to fit within the U.S. dual-sovereign, Federal-State sys-
tem. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the effect of a
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must be distinguished from interests that private citizens may remedy by
litigation, as well as from the sovereign and proprietary interests of the
state. Courts classify the following three interests as quasi-sovereign
interests: protecting the physical welfare of citizens, ensuring the well-
being of the economy, and maintaining a state's rightful position in the
federal system.
A clear delineation of the previous categories is difficult. 46 Indeed,
the Supreme Court has never specifically defined a quasi-sovereign
interest. As the Court explained in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto
Rico, "[q]uasi-sovereign interests ... consist of a set of interests that the
State has in the well-being of its populace. Formulated so broadly, the
concept risks being too vague .... The vagueness of this concept can
only be filled in by turning to individual cases." 47 The following cases
provide some guidance for determining what constitutes a quasi-sover-
eign interest.
The cases fall into three basic groups. First, States have historically
succeeded in obtaining parens patriae standing to protect the physical
well-being of their citizens by enjoining public nuisances. 48
Second, a State's quasi-sovereign interest includes protecting its
economic well-being.49 The differing outcomes of two cases illustrate
the limits of this aspect of the doctrine. In Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,50
Pennsylvania obtained parens patriae standing to enjoin West Virginia
from withdrawing its natural gas from interstate commerce. 5 1 The
Court found that such a withdrawal of natural gas would seriously jeop-
ardize the Pennsylvania citizens' health, comfort and welfare. 52 In
Oklahoma v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. ,53 however, the Court denied
Oklahoma standing when it sought to prevent a railroad company from
charging unreasonable rates for a few specific commodities. 54
Oklahoma alleged that these commodities were essential to the develop-
ment of the state.5 5 According to the Court, as later clarified in
foreign nation claimingparenspatriae standing instead of a State, see infra notes 71-79
and accompanying text.
46. AlfredL. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601. "[A] quasi-sovereign interest.., is a judicial
construct that does not lend itself to a simple or exact definition." Id.
47. Id. at 602.
48. See, e.g. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) (flooding); Wyoming
v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (division of water); New York v. New Jersey, 256
U.S. 296 (1921) (water pollution); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S 230
(1907) (air pollution); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (division of water);
Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902) (division of water); Missouri v. Illinois, 180
U.S. 208 (1901) (water pollution); see also Annotation, State's Standing to Sue on Behalf of
its Citizens, 42 A.L.R. FED. 23 (1979).
49. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 592-93.
53. 220 U.S. 277 (1911).
54. Id. at 289. The commodities were lime, cement, plaster, brick, stone and oil.
Id. at 286-87.
55. Id. at 284.
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Oklahoma v. Cook,5 6 the State had no direct interest in the transportation
of these commodities, but was instead trying to represent the rights of
the shippers.5 7 Despite the possible broad reading of Pennsylvania, that a
state may sue as parens patriae to remedy the economic harms of its citi-
zens, the two Oklahoma decisions demonstrate that courts will only grant
parens patriae standing to a State seeking to protect its economic well-
being when the injury harms the entire populace, and individuals cannot
sue to remedy the situation.
Third, a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in maintaining its right-
ful status within the federal system. 58 Theseparenspatriae actions allow a
State to guarantee its residents either the benefits created, or hardships
alleviated by federal statutes. 5 9 This doctrinal allowance is obviously
inapplicable to foreign sovereigns such as India.
Quasi-sovereign interests must be distinguished from other inter-
ests that might motivate a State to sue but which do not constitute
grounds for parens patriae standing. A State's quasi-sovereign interests
do not include its citizens' own private interests. 60 States also have pro-
prietary and sovereign interests. Proprietary interests result from own-
ership of land or participation in business ventures. 61 Sovereign
interests include "[t]he exercise of sovereign power over individuals and
entities within the relevant jurisdiction ... [and] the demand for recog-
nition from other sovereigns .... -62 None of these state interests are
"quasi-sovereign," and no case has allowed them to give a state standing
under the parens patriae doctrine.
B. Limitations on the Right of a State to Sue as Parens Patriae
The courts have placed three limitations onparenspatriae standing. First,
the defendant must violate an interest of the State, independent of the
interest of its particular citizens (i.e., a quasi-sovereign interest). 63 Sec-
ond, the harm must extend to a substantial portion of the population. 64
Third, the State must overcome the courts' skepticism towards State
assertion of a quasi-sovereign interest in the well-being of the State's
economy.6 5
56. Oklahoma v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 395 (1938) (interpreting Oklahoma v. Atch-
ison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 220 U.S 277 (1911)).
57. Atchison, 220 U.S. at 287.
58. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
59. See, e.g., id. (federal employment service scheme); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451
U.S. 725 (1981) (Natural Gas Act); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439
(1945) (federal antitrust laws).
60. See infra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
61. Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601.
62. Id.
63. See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
65. Moreover, the Court rarely finds such an interest if there is no corresponding
injury to the state's position in the federal system. See infra notes 80-90 and accompa-
nying text.
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1. State's Interest Must be Independent of Citizens' Interest
The courts refrain from granting parens patriae standing when private
individuals can obtain adequate relief.6 6 Thus, a State cannot use parens
patriae to represent the individual interests of particular citizens; the
State must have its own independently wronged quasi-sovereign inter-
est.6 7 The Supreme Court established this limitation in 1907 in Georgia
v. Tennessee Copper Co. 68 This limitation seeks to protect defendants from
double liability that could occur if both a State and an individual could
sue for the individual's harm.69 Thus, historically, a State has success-
fully maintained parens patriae standing when no one individual could sue
and obtain adequate relief.70
2. Injury to Substantial Portion of the Population
Although parens patriae standing requires that the injury extend to the
public-at-large, it need not directly harm all of a state's citizens. Injury
to a substantial segment of the population will probably justify parens
patriae standing. 7 1 Furthermore, even when the harm directly affects an
identifiable group of persons, a court may sustain parens patriae standing
if the harm extends indirectly to a substantial portion of the popula-
tion. 72 For example, in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, Virginia
apple growers directly discriminated against an indentifiable group of
Puerto Rican citizens. The Supreme Court granted Puerto Rico parens
patriae standing, however, because the indirect effects of discrimination
66. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 324 U.S. 439 (1911)
(court denied Oklahomaparenspatriae standing to sue the railroad for excessive rates,
since the shippers could sue); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975)
(court denied several governments parens patriae standing to sue U.S. pharmaceutical
companies for excessive prices, since foreign nationals could sue).
67. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
68. Id.
69. See generally New York v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883); Note, Civil Procedure-
The Right of a State to Sue as Parens Patriae-Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 19
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 471 (1983).
70. See, e.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (parens patriae
standing granted to sue twenty railroads for conspiracy to fix prices in violation of
§ 16 of the Clayton Act, article III, § 2 of the U.S. Constitution, and 28 U.S.C. § 341);
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (parens patriae standing
granted to Georgia to seek injunctive relief to prevent Tennessee Copper Co. from
discharging noxious gases which spread over Georgia even though elements which
would form the basis of relief between private parties were wanting); Missouri v. Illi-
nois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (court granted Missouri parenspatriae standing to sue for an
injunction to prevent Illinois from discharging sewage into the Mississippi river).
71. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
72. Id. The Court's language on this point is somewhat contradictory. An identi-
fiable group of Puerto Rican citizens who came to the United States to work in the
apple orchards was directly harmed. The Court said indirect harm to a substantial
portion of the population would justify parens patriae standing. However, the Court
held that discrimination directly harms the entire population. For the future, it
remains unclear whether the indirect harm must be to the entire population as
required by Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900), or if indirect harm to a substantial
portion of the population will suffice.
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"carry a universal sting" 7 3 and thus indirectly harmed all Puerto
Ricans. 74
The fact that individuals may find it difficult to file suit, however,
will not justify grantingparenspatriae standing. In Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord,75 the
court deniedparenspatriae standing to four foreign governments seeking
to sue several U.S. drug companies for conspiring to fix prices. The
widespread purchase and use of the overpriced drugs by these coun-
tries' citizens did not justify their governments' parens patriae interven-
tion. 76 Although the harm affected a substantial segment of the
population, the injured individuals could sue the drug companies in
their own right. The governments argued that the parens patriae concept
should be expanded so they could "sue on behalf of persons legally enti-
tled to sue on their own behalf, but as a practical matter generally
unable to do so." 77 The court rejected this argument, but suggested
that governments might be able to bring a class action suit on behalf of
their citizens. 78 Moreover, in rejecting the plea that distance made pri-
vate suits impractical, the court said that "[t]he mere fact that the claim-
ant or creditor is a foreign national does not afford him or his
government access to judicial procedures barred to domestic
creditors. "79
3. Courts Treat Skeptically a State's Assertion of a Quasi-Sovereign Interest in
the Well-Being of the Economy
Courts view skeptically a State's arguments regarding injury to its gen-
eral economy as a basis for parens patriae standing. States have success-
fully asserted this injury only twice.80 The Supreme Court stated its
reason for this skepticism in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.: "A large and
ultimately indeterminable part of the injury to the 'general economy,'
.. is no more than a reflection of injuries to the 'business or property'
of consumers, for which they may recover themselves .... ,,8,
In both cases where the State successfully maintained parens patriae
standing for an injury to the general economy, the State had another
element to its argument besides economic injury. In Alfred L. Snapp &
73. Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607.
74. Id. at 609.
75. 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975).
76. See id.
77. Id. at 617.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592 (1982) (refusal
by Virginia apple growers to use Puerto Rican pickers harmed Puerto Rican econ-
omy); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (price fixing by rail-
roads is a monopolistic activity that harms Georgian economy). But see Pennsylvania
v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923). Although Pennsylvania argued that with-
drawal of natural gas from commerce would hurt its economy, Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord,
522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975), has interpreted Pennsylvania as seeking an injunction to
prevent a potential injury to the physical well-being of its citizens.
81. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972).
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Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, as already seen, the Court found that Puerto Rico
had a substantial interest both in protecting its residents from discrimi-
nation,8 2 and pursuing the Commonwealth's full and equal participation
in a federal employment service scheme.8 3 In Georgia v. Pennsylvania
Railroad Co. ,84 Georgia sought injunctive relief under § 16 of the Clay-
ton Act against several railroads for conspiracy to fix prices. Georgia
claimed that her freedom from antitrust conspiracies, guaranteed to all
the states by the federal government, was being violated.8 5 Thus, in
addition to damage to her general economy, Georgia could argue that
her quasi-sovereign interest in maintaining her equal position among
the states had been violated.8 6 In contrast, Oklahoma v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Ry. resulted in the denial of parens patriae standing.8 7 The
Court refused to find that the economic harm to Oklahoma's industrial
development was anything other than the sum of specific harms actiona-
ble by private parties.
Dicta in Hawaii v. Standard Oil8 8 elucidates one reason for the
courts' skepticism. There, the Court suggests that suits for physical
harm are usually injunctive in nature, whereas suits for damages contain
the danger of double liability.89 If the State can receive damages as
parens patriae, the individuals harmed may still have standing to sue,
leaving the defendant open to multiple liability.90
III. Analysis
A. The Court Should Have Denied India Parens Patriae Standing
Although the district court denied India the exclusive representation of
the plaintiffs, the court did not decide if the Indian government was a
proper party to the litigation. 9 1 The court should have denied India
parens patriae standing before deciding the forum non conveniens issue.
India did not have an injured quasi-sovereign interest, but instead
merely sought to represent the individual claims of its citizens.9 2 The
court's failure to reach the parens patriae issue significantly reduced the
plaintiffs' ability to settle the case and sets a precedent for the same
result in future cases.
82. Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 608-10.
83. Id.
84. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
85. Id. at 497.
86. Id.
87. Oklahoma v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 220 U.S. 277 (1911).
88. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
89. Id. at 261-62.
90. Id.
91. In re Union Carbide Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
92. See supra notes 45-62 and accompanying text.
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1. Lack of a Quasi-Sovereign Interest
a. India is Not Protecting the Physical Well-Being of its People
Generally, parens patriae standing for physical harm has been based on
harm to the environment, and the relief sought has been an injunction,
not damages. 93 Cases allowing such suits do so to prevent harms, such as
enjoining the diversion of water from an interstate stream, 94 or
enjoining the discharge of sewage into the Mississippi. 95 Justice Holmes
described such an interest as "independent of and behind the titles of its
citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. ' ' 9 6 Union Carbide,
however, has caused harm to individual citizens, rather than a continu-
ing harm to the environment necessitating an injunction. Although
physical harm from the gas leak may continue, the actual leak has
ceased. Intervention by India, therefore, is unnecessary. Although
200,000 Indian citizens suffered physical harm, the degree or extent of
the harm will not alone justify parens patriae standing.9 7 The harm may
affect every citizen, but parens patriae standing will not be justified unless
the state has an injured quasi-sovereign interest. The state must have an
injured interest, separate from the summation of individual citizens'
interests, "independent of and behind the titles of its citizens...."
9 8
b. India is Not Suing to Protect its Citizens' Economic Welfare
India is not seeking to protect the economic well-being of its people. No
independent harm to the State exists; rather, the economic harm is a
summation of individual economic harms. Granted, the individual vic-
tims suffered severe economic harm, but the injured individuals can sue
to recover damages.
A comparison to a case where the economic harm did give rise to a
quasi-sovereign interest may prove helpful. In Georgia v. Pennsylvania
R.R. Co., 99 Georgia alleged that the defendant railroads had violated
antitrust laws by conspiring to fix rates in a way that discriminated
against Georgia. 10 0 The Court wrote that,
[trade barriers] may cause a blight no less serious than the spread of nox-
ious gas over the land or the deposit of sewage in the streams. They may
93. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612, 616 (8th Cir. 1975).
94. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
95. Missiouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
96. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). Mr. Justice
Holmes noted that when a state sues the defendant for injuring one of its quasi-
sovereign interests, the suit differs significantly from a case between two private par-
ties. The grounds which give rise to equitable relief among fellow citizens are lacking.
Equitable grounds for granting fellow citizens relief do not exist when a state substi-
tutes for a probable plaintiff. The state may not own the damaged territory. Further-
more, a court cannot estimate the state's damage in money. The states gave up
certain rights by joining the union; yet their quasi-sovereign interests remain. Parens
patriae provides states with an alternative to force in protecting these interests.
97. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
98. Georgia, 206 U.S. at 237.
99. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
100. Id. at 443.
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affect the prosperity and welfare of a state... profoundly.... Georgia as
a representative of the public is complaining of a wrong which, if proven,
limits the opportunities of her people, shackles her industries, retards her
development, and relegates her to an inferior economic position among
her sister States. 10 1
This kind of claim clearly fits the dictum ofJustice Holmes that a "State
has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens." 10 2
The economic harm occurring in Bhopal, in contrast, is to specific indi-
viduals. Compensating the individuals, not the State, will compensate
for the harm. Moreover, in alleging harm to its economic well-being,
Georgia also was being deprived of the benefits of the federal antitrust
laws and thus was seeking restoration to its rightful place within the Fed-
eral system. In addition, the remedy sought in Georgia was injunctive
relief, directed at continuing economic harm, and precluding double
recovery from the same defendant. 10 3
2. India Improperly Seeks to Represent the Individual Claims of her Citizens
The Indian government provided in the Bhopal Ordinance that "the
central government shall represent and act in place of any claimant." 104
Therefore, even if India shows that Union Carbide harmed a quasi-sov-
ereign interest, the court should not grant parens patriae standing. A
court will refuse to grant parens patriae standing if the state usurps its
citizens' claims, despite making a prima facie case that a quasi-sovereign
interest has been harmed. In New York v. Louisiana,10 5 for example, the
Court denied parens patriae standing for claims that individuals had
assigned to the state. After a group of New York residents had assigned
their Louisiana consolidated bonds to New York, New York sued Louisi-
ana for the balance due on the bonds. 10 6 The Court held that one state
cannot create a controversy with another state by assuming debts owed
to its citizens and then suing for payment of the debts.10 7 Just as in New
York v. Louisiana, the Bhopal Ordinance reveals a clear intent by India to
usurp the specific claims of its citizens.
3. The Bhopal Ordinance Violates U.S. Sovereignty
The doctrine of sovereignty assumes that each nation legislates for itself,
that its legislation governs itself alone, and that its legislation operates
only within its own territory.10 8 One State's actions, however, fre-
quently have effects beyond the State's borders. The United States will
only give legal effect to a foreign sovereign's actions if such actions fall
101. Id. at 450-51.
102. Georgia, 206 U.S. at 237.
103. Pennsylvania, 324 U.S. at 443.
104. Riley, supra note 5 (quoting the Bhopal Ordinance).
105. 108 U.S. 76 (1883).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 91.
108. 45 AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 38 (1969).
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within one of two doctrines: the act of state doctrine or the principles of
comity.
The Supreme Court provided the classic formulation of the act of
state doctrine in Underhill v. Hernandez: a0 9 "Every sovereign is bound to
respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts
of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of another done
within its own territory." 110 The act of state doctine thus confers pre-
sumptive validity on certain acts of a foreign sovereign by rendering
claims that challenge such acts non-justiciable."' The purpose of the
doctrine is to avoid embarrassing the executive in its exercise of foreign
relations if that might occur by inquiring judicially into the validity of a
foreign sovereign's acts.1 12 In the United States, this doctrine is a func-
tion of separation of powers, according preeminence in foreign policy
matters to the executive and legislature. 1 13
The act of state doctrine gives legal effect to a foreign sovereign's
actions, in that U.S. courts will not entertain a legal challenge to the
sovereign's actions."i 4 The doctrine only applies, however, when the
act, such as a taking of property, is accomplished within the foreign sov-
ereign's borders."i 5
The act of state doctrine does not protect the Bhopal Ordinance.
The Ordinance declared that the Indian government "shall have the
exclusive right to represent, and act in place of every person who has
made claim or is entitled to make" a claim against Union Carbide
Corp.116 By dictating that the Indian government has standing to sue in
U.S. courts, the Bhopal Ordinance clearly acts beyond India's borders,
making the act of state doctrine inapplicable.
Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola De Cartago explains
that when an act of a foreign government falls outside the act of state
doctrine, recognition of the act by the courts will only be granted if the
principles of comity necessitate that result." 17 Comity requires that U.S.
courts recognize acts of foreign governments only if they are consistent
with the law and policy of the United States." 8
The Bhopal Ordinance clearly contradicts U.S. policy. One of the
settled principles of parens patriae standing is that U.S. courts refuse to
grant such standing if the State is usurping its citizens' claims. 1 9 The
109. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
110. Id. at 252.
111. Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola De Cartago, 757 F.2d
516, 520 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985).
112. Id. at 520-21.
113. Id. at 520 (discussing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
427 (1964)).
114. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 367 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
115. Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 521.
116. Riley, supra note 5 (quoting the Bhopal Ordinance).
117. Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 522.
118. Id.
119. See supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
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Ordinance specifically requires India to act "in place of" every person
who has a claim. 120 Therefore, principles of comity do not apply.
The ordinance legislates who has standing to sue in U.S. courts.
This intended extraterritorial effect violates U.S. sovereignty. Under the
doctrine of sovereignty (unless covered by the act of state doctrine or
principles of comity), only U.S. legislation can determine who has stand-
ing to sue in U.S. courts.' 2 ' India anticipated that the ordinance might
violate U.S. sovereignty and therefore drafted it to allow judicial discre-
tion. 122 Although the ordinance's first section grants India "exclusive"
representation of the claimants, the second section states that "the Gov-
ernment shall represent, and act in place of, or along with, such claimant
[for suits already filed] as such court or other authority so permits.' 125
4. Policy Reasons Support Denial of Parens Patriae Standing to India
Policy as well as legal reasons support denying India parens patriae stand-
ing. First, the Indian Constitution grants its citizens the right to pursue
actionable claims, implying a right to settle claims. 124 Therefore, argua-
bly the Bhopal Ordinance violates the Indian Constitution. Second, the
$358 million offer may exceed whatever damage award could be
obtained by litigation in India, since Union Carbide, India, Ltd., has
assets of only $70 million. The risks of pursuing litigation will subse-
quently be discussed, but given the risks, accepting the settlement offer
is a reasonable decision. Third, the U.S. court system allows judicial
scrutiny of proposed settlements, 12 5 thus providing plaintiffs with ade-
quate safeguards from making a bad decision. Intervention by India to
prevent the plaintiffs from accepting an inappropriate settlement was
unnecessary. Although the plaintiffs in the Bhopal litigation requested
that Judge Keenan review Union Carbide's $358 million settlement
offer, he refused because India had already rejected the offer. There-
fore, not only did India lack legal standing to parens patriae representa-
tion, but given the above arguments, it also lacked practical or policy
reasons for bending or expanding the law in this particular case.
B. Settlement: The Best Solution
Although the plaintiffs wanted to accept Union Carbide's $358 million
settlement offer, the Indian government refused to settle and threatened
to pursue litigation based on parens patriae.12 6 Three reasons demon-
strate why settlement offers a better solution than a change of forum to
India. First, industrial disaster victims need immediate compensation;
settlement provides such timely compensation. Without settlement, liti-
120. See supra text accompanying note 116.
121. See 45 AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 38 (1969).
122. Riley, supra note 5 (quoting the Bhopal Ordinance).
123. Id. (quoting the Bhopal Ordinance).
124. See supra note 21.
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
126. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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gation now continues and will probably continue for several years.1 2 7
Meanwhile, the victims remain uncompensated.128 Two years after the
Bhopal disaster, the courts have merely managed to decide the proper
forum for litigation; 129 a trial on the merits has not even begun.
Second, settlement guarantees that the victims receive more than a
minimal award. The accident occurred at a pesticide plant owned by
Union Carbide, India, Ltd., a corporate entity with attachable assets of
only $70 million. 130 To collect damages exceeding $70 million, the
plaintiffs must prove the legal culpability of the parent company, Union
Carbide Corp.1 3 1 Legally, Union Carbide Corp. may not be liable for
the Bhopal disaster.13 2 In order to pursue litigation in India, jurisdic-
tion over Union Carbide Corp. must be obtained. Even then, an Indian
court judgment probably would not end the litigation. India would have
to return to the United States to enforce the judgment against Union
Carbide Corp. and levy the judgment against Union Carbide's U.S.
assets. United States courts, however, often refuse to enforce such for-
eign judgments.133
127. Galanter, supra note 13, at 276-77. The case of a Lufthansa pilot illustrates
the problems of prolonged litigation in India. Left quadraplegic after a New Delhi
hotel swimming pool accident, the pilot sued the hotel in 1974. Ten years later the
counsel stated that "[trial is years away and appeals could take decades." Stewart,
supra note 13, at 16, col. 2.
128. The Indian government and Union Carbide have given minimal emergency
aid to some victims. Judge Keenan urged Union Carbide to create a $5 to $10 mil-
lion emergency relief fund. Gates, 100 Lawyers Start the Legal Cleanup, 7 Nat'l LJ., Apr.
29, 1985, at 13. Although an emergency fund constitutes a nice gesture, especially
considering the inefficiency of the legal system, the courts should concentrate on
timely compensating the victims.
129. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
130. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
131. Assuming the plaintiffs successfully overcome the preliminary legal issues,
Union Carbide Corp. may still not suffer liability for the Bhopal disaster. First, the
plaintiffs must establish Union Carbide, India, Ltd.'s liability. Such a burden may
prove difficult, especially because the Indian government may have negligently
inspected and maintained the plant. Dhavan, For Whom? and For What? Reflections on
the Legal Aftermath of Bhopal, 20 TEx. INT'L LJ. 295, 302-03 (1985). Second, a finding
that Union Carbide, India, Ltd., is liable does not make Union Carbide Corp. liable.
Because they are two separate corporations, the plaintiffs must convince the court to
pierce the corporate veil. Such a task is difficult to accomplish under U.S. law. If
Union Carbide Corp. (the parent of Union Carbide, India, Ltd.) is not liable, only the
$70 million from Union Carbide, India, Ltd. will be available to satisfy a judgment.
Westbrook, Theories of Parent Company Liability and the Prospects for an International Settle-
ment, 20 TEX. INT'L LJ. 321 (1985). Third, if Union Carbide Corp. is liable, India may
have to proceed through U.S. courts to enforce the judgment. Thus, successful liti-
gation of this case is questionable.
132. See Westbrook, supra note 131.
133. Foreign judgments are enforceable in the United States as conclusive against
the parties. See Art. 53, Recognition of Foreign Country Money Judgments, 7B N.Y.
CiV. PROC L. & R. §§ 5301-09 (McKinney 1978). However, the court will have an
enforcement hearing, allowing the defendant to raise defenses such as lack of due
process. Judge Keenan feared that a court might not enforce an Indian judgment,
therefore, he conditioned his dismissal on Union Carbide's consent to the enforce-
ability of as Indian judgment. In re Union Carbide Corp Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F.
Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The second circuit reversed, citing the above statute. In
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Finally, parens patriae may not obligate India to distribute any
awarded damages to the victims. 13 4 Because India would theoretically
be suing as parens patriae for harm done to its quasi-sovereign interest,
independent from the interests of the accident victims, the State theoret-
ically could retain the recovered damages.1 35 In prior cases, this result
has not presented a problem because parens patriae suits have sought
injunctive relief, ending a continuing harm. In such suits, the citizens
receive the benefit of the injunction even though legally the state
received it. Although the Alfred court stated that damages were available
under parens patriae, no court has decided who is entitled to the damages.
The fact that the plaintiffs wanted to accept settlement is itself an
argument that settlement is the best solution. They and their represent-
atives are in the best position to know what they most need: compensa-
tion now, or the chance of greater compensation later. When present
value is taken into consideration, even a substantially greater sum of
money five years from now would not equal the value of the smaller sum
today. Although India can afford to wait to protect its sovereign pride,
the interests of the victims are substantially different.
1. Court Should Identify the Parties to Facilitate Settlement
To facilitate settlement, the courts should identify the parties with legal
standing to sue. Such identification eliminates improper claimants from
impeding settlement negotiations. A large-scale disaster involves many
groups with differing interests. In the Bhopal case these included: the
victims, Union Carbide, the Indian government, and the plaintiffs' law-
yers who solicited clients from among the victims. 13 6 Requiring Union
Carbide to negotiate with each separate interest group would decrease
the probability of settling the case. 13 7 The court partially alleviated this
problem by naming a three member executive committee to represent
the plaintiffs, displacing many lawyers who sought ligitation to guaran-
tee their own fee.13 8 The court needed, however, to narrow the parties
further by reaching the issue of India's parens patriae standing. It should
have removed India as a party to the case so the real parties at issue
could settle.
2. The Class Action Suit with the State as Representative
As an alternative to aparenspatriae action, the courts in Hawaii v. Standard
Oil Co. 139 and Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord 140 suggested that the state could bring a
re Union Carbide Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 194
(1987).
134. See generally Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592 (1982).
135. Id.
136. Dhavan, supra note 131 at 305.
137. Indeed, we have seen how difficult, even impossible it has been for Union
Carbide to reach a settlement when it must negotiate with two parties at interest: the
victims and the Indian government. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
138. See Judge Selects Panel to Direct Bhopal Litigation, supra note 21.
139. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
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class action suit on behalf of its citizens. 14 1 Whether courts should pro-
mote such suits in disaster cases like Bhopal involves a weighing of rela-
tive advantages and disadvantages beyond the scope of this Note. This
Note will, however, briefly outline the relative factors.
In the Bhopal case, the interests of India and the victims are very
different. The victims need immediate compensation, and may, there-
fore, settle for a smaller amount of money. India, however, can wait
several years for a large sum that satisfies its sovereign pride. India can
afford the risks of pursuing litigation. The goal is more money than
what could be achieved by settlement. The risks are that: 1) the suit
could fail; 2) India might win against Union Carbide, India, Ltd., but fail
to pierce the corporate veil and reach the assets of the parent company;
and 3) India might win against the parent company in court, but be
unable to enforce the judgment in U.S. courts, limiting recovery to the
$70 million assets of Union Carbide, India, Ltd. 14 2 The plaintiffs did
not wish to accept these risks.143 Consequently, India's objectives differ
from the plaintiffs' so greatly that India should not be allowed to repre-
sent the class.
One advantage of the class action suit, however, is that settlement
can be reached over the representative's objection, and such settlement
becomes res judicata to the entire class. The courts have uniformly used
fairness to the class, rather than consent of named representatives, as
the standard for settlement approval.' 4 4 Therefore, in the Bhopal litiga-
tion, the parties could settle despite India's objection and preclude India
from a subsequent suit.
In addition, once a settlement is reached, the class action suit gives
the court extensive discretion to manage the case and construct a plan
for the distribution of damages.' 45 Distribution of damages among the
Bhopal victims will prove difficult, but such difficulties exist regardless
of the methods used to obtain compensation.' 4 6 A class action suit
anticipates these difficulties and gives the court the discretion necessary
to fashion an appropriate solution.
IV. Conclusion
The disaster continues as long as the Bhopal victims, or victims of any
industrial accident, go without compensation. Settlement, which com-
pensates victims quickly, offers the best means to alleviate this suffering.
140. 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975).
141. Hawaii, 405 U.S. at 266; Pfizer, 522 F.2d at 618.
142. See supra note 131.
143. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
144. See Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1171 n.19 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 967 (1976); Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 494 F.2d 799, 803 (3d Cir.)
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974); see also Strickler, Protecting the Class: The Search for the
Adequate Representative in Class Action Litigation, 34 DEPAUL L. REV. 73 (1984).
145. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e); Blumenthal, Awards Proposed in Agent Orange Suit, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 28, 1985, at BI, col. 1.
146. Dhavan, supra note 131, at 305-06.
200 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 21
The courts can facilitate settlement by properly identifying the victims
with standing to sue. In the Bhopal disaster case, the courts should have
decided the parens patriae issue and denied India, as representative of her
citizens, standing to sue Union Carbide and receive their compensation.
Unfortunately, the Bhopal victims still wait.
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